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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), 
several PUC Commissioners, and several Pennsylvania 
State Senators appeal the District Court's denial of their 
motions to dismiss the claims and cross-claims brought 
against them under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by 
Bell Atlantic (now known as Verizon), MCI/Worldcom 
(Worldcom), and AT&T. The PUC and the Commissioners 
argue that under the Eleventh Amendment they are 
immune from suit in federal court and that the claims and 
cross-claims against them are untimely and barred by res 
judicata. 
 
For the reasons stated in our decision in MCI Telecomm. 
Corp. v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., [Nos. 00-2257, 00-2258, 
November 2, 2001] ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 2001), decided this 
day, we will affirm the District Court's denial of the defense 
of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. We further hold that we 
have no jurisdiction to hear the PUC's remaining claims on 
appeal; we will dismiss them for want of jurisdiction and 
remand the case to the District Court. 
 
I. Background 
 
The statutory background of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 and a discussion of its operation is set out in our 
companion opinion in MCI Telecomm. The Act essentially 
requires incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share 
their networks and services with competitive local exchange 
carriers (CLECs) seeking entry into the local service market. 
 
Verizon, an ILEC, was involved in negotiations with 
Worldcom, a CLEC, to provide local service in Pennsylvania. 
These talks were part of several ongoing negotiations for 
interconnection agreements proceeding before the PUC. In 
1998, the PUC initiated discussions aimed at a global 
settlement of a variety of pending and anticipated issues 
arising in several different dockets. Competing petitions 
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were filed with the PUC by two groups, one consisting of 
Verizon and other companies, the other consisting of AT&T, 
Worldcom, the State Senators, and others who had opposed 
Verizon in various PUC proceedings. 
 
In September 1999, the PUC issued a Global Order, 
resolving the issues before it and ordering that the 
decisions be incorporated into interconnection agreements. 
Verizon appealed the Global Order to the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania, primarily challenging it on state law 
grounds. Verizon did assert its federal claims under the 
1996 Act in the Commonwealth Court although Verizon 
claims that this was done solely for the purpose of making 
a reservation of the federal issues, pursuant to England v. 
Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 421 
(1964) (holding that plaintiff may preserve federal claims by 
presenting them to state court only for the purpose of 
informing the state court of their existence and nature). 
 
Verizon then brought suit in federal district court against 
the PUC and individual PUC Commissioners under 
S 252(e)(6), challenging terms of the Global Order as being 
inconsistent with the 1996 Act.1 Worldcom and AT&T 
intervened as defendants and counterclaimed and cross- 
claimed to challenge other aspects of the Global Order. 
Several Pennsylvania Senators intervened as defendants. 
The United States intervened as plaintiff to defend the 
constitutionality of S 252(e). 
 
The Senators, the PUC, and the Commissioners moved to 
dismiss the suit on grounds, among others, that the PUC 
and the Commissioners were immune from suit in federal 
court under the Eleventh Amendment, that Worldcom's and 
AT&T's cross-claims were untimely, and that the remainder 
of the claims should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim. The District Court denied the motions in all respects.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. During the pendency of the instant appeal, Verizon notified this Court 
that it was withdrawing its underlying claims in the District Court. 
Because the cross-claims and counterclaims remain, the case has not 
been rendered moot. 
2. The District Court also considered and rejected arguments that it 
should abstain from hearing the case, pursuant to a variety of federal 
abstention doctrines. The abstention issues have not been appealed and 
are not before us. 
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The PUC, the Commissioners, and the Senators 
immediately appealed the District Court's decision, not only 
the Eleventh Amendment immunity ruling but also the 
denial of the bar of the statute of limitations and res 
judicata. 
 
II. Collateral Order Doctrine 
 
With certain exceptions not applicable here, we may take 
jurisdiction of appeals only from the entry of a final 
judgment by a District Court. See 28 U.S.C.S 1291; 
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 200 (1999). 
A decision ordinarily is final when it ends the litigation and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment. See id. at 204 (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. 
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521-22 (1988)). 
 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "final 
decision" in S 1291 to include a narrow class of orders that 
do not terminate the litigation but are conclusive of a 
disputed legal question apart from the merits and are 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment in 
the underlying action. See Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 204; 
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 
867-68 (1994). The collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), is a 
practical construction of the final decision rule ofS 1291, 
applicable to a narrow class of decisions that are 
considered final in the interest of achieving a healthy and 
efficient legal system. See Digital, 511 U.S. at 867. An order 
is immediately reviewable under Cohen if it 1) conclusively 
determines a disputed legal question, 2) resolves an 
important issue completely separable from the merits of the 
action, and 3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment. See Bines v. Kulayat, 215 F.3d 381, 384-85 
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A&Z Septic 
Clean., 5 F.3d 51, 55 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 
Importantly, the collateral order doctrine is narrow and 
limited to a small class of cases. See Digital , 511 U.S. at 
868 ("[T]he `narrow' exception should stay that way and 
never be allowed to swallow the general rule."); see also 
Bines, 215 F.3d at 384; Transtech, 5 F.3d at 57. The 
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application of the doctrine does not turn on whether the 
litigation will be speeded along by immediate review. See 
Digital, 511 U.S. at 868. The fact that an erroneous ruling 
may result in additional litigation expenses is not alone 
sufficient to justify immediate review. See Transtech, 5 F.3d 
at 56; see also 15A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure  S 3914.6, 
529 (recognizing that "much time and money are spent on 
trial court proceedings that ultimately prove abortive," but 
stating that the "cost is tolerated because of the 
fundamental calculus of the final judgment rule"). 
 
The District Court denied motions to dismiss the 
complaint and cross-claims by the PUC, the 
Commissioners, and the Senators. The denial of a motion to 
dismiss does not end the litigation and ordinarily is not a 
final order for S 1291 purposes. See 15A Wright, Miller, & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure S 3914.6 at 526 
("Orders refusing to dismiss an action almost always are 
not final."). We may assert appellate jurisdiction over the 
issues before us only if they are the types of claims which 
fall within the narrow class of decisions immediately 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen. 
 
A. Sovereign Immunity 
 
We have jurisdiction over the Eleventh Amendment 
issues because the denial of a defense of sovereign 
immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral 
order doctrine. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993). 
 
The sovereign immunity issue in the instant case was 
consolidated for oral argument with the immunity issue in 
MCI Telecomm., ___ F.3d ___, decided this day. The legal 
issues and arguments in both cases are substantially 
identical and we need not repeat them in the instant 
opinion. The result on the merits is also the same: Neither 
the PUC nor the Commissioners have Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from an action under S 252(e)(6). For the reasons 
stated in our opinion in MCI Telecomm, we will affirm the 
District Court's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar the actions against the PUC and the 
Commissioners. 
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B. Res Judicata and Statute of Limitations  
 
We turn now to the two remaining issues on appeal: the 
PUC's argument that the claims and cross-claims against it 
are untimely and are barred by res judicata. 
 
The PUC suggested at oral argument that, because we 
have collateral order doctrine jurisdiction over the sovereign 
immunity issue, we had the discretion to reach and decide 
the remaining issues in the interest of judicial economy, 
regardless of whether those issues are themselves 
immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. 
We reject that suggestion. Our appellate jurisdiction is 
established by statute. We can exercise no jurisdiction 
other than as provided by statute. The fact that we have 
jurisdiction over one issue on an appeal does not grant us 
discretion to decide unrelated issues which lack an 
independent basis for jurisdiction. See Triad Assocs., Inc. v. 
Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 496-97 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating 
that the fact that court had collateral order jurisdiction to 
review denial of immunity defense "is not sufficient to 
confer on us jurisdiction to review other claims presented to 
the district court" because "[o]therwise nonappealable 
issues cannot be bootstrapped to an appealable question"). 
Nor are concerns for judicial economy alone a sufficient 
consideration to create jurisdiction. See Digital, 511 U.S. at 
868. 
 
We reach the merits of the two remaining issues only if 
they are subject to immediate review under Cohen . We 
conclude that neither the denial of a motion to dismiss on 
res judicata grounds nor the denial of a motion to dismiss 
on statute of limitations grounds is immediately appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine. We lack jurisdiction to 
address either of these issues on their merits and for the 
reasons that follow we will dismiss the appeal of these 
claims for want of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
Not only is it generally recognized that the denial of a 
motion to dismiss on res judicata, or claim preclusion, 
grounds should not be immediately appealable, see, e.g., 
Digital, 511 U.S. at 873; Transtech, 5 F.3d at 58; see also 
15A Wright, Miller, Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 3911.4 at 424-26, but more particularly the defense of 
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claim preclusion in the instant case fails the first and third 
prongs of the Cohen standard. First, the District Court's 
decision did not conclusively resolve the claim preclusion 
issue because the District Court never addressed or 
resolved it. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
decision to which the PUC seeks to accord preclusive effect 
did not issue until after the District Court had rendered its 
decision. Although the District Court took explicit notice of 
the pendency of the state court action, there was no state 
court decision for it to consider at the time. The court never 
had an opportunity to address the res judicata effect of the 
state court judgment and cannot be deemed to have 
conclusively resolved that legal issue for purposes of 
collateral order doctrine jurisdiction.3  
 
Second, the denial of a defense of claim preclusion is not 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. We 
have recognized two distinct categories of affirmative 
defensive immunities: those that provide immunity from 
suit and those that provide only a defense against liability. 
See Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 143-44 (discussing 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)) (distinguishing 
immunities from suit from defenses to liability); see also 15 
A Wright, Miller, Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 3914.6 at 529 ("[S]ome rights are intended to protect 
against the burdens of trial, not just the burden of a 
judgment that, if erroneous, can be reversed on appeal."). 
 
An immunity from suit generally is grounded in the need 
to free parties from the costs, burdens, and consequences 
of having to be party to an action and to defend one's self. 
Such a right will be forfeited if not vindicated prior to trial, 
see Transtech, 5 F.3d at 56; 15A Wright, Miller, Cooper, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We also could decline to address the res judicata issue for a second, 
unrelated reason: the argument was not raised in the District Court. Our 
general practice is not to address legal issues not raised below, absent 
exceptional circumstances. See Berda v. CBS, Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 28 (3d 
Cir. 1989). No such exceptional circumstances are present and neither 
the PUC nor the Senators point to any such circumstances. Moreover, 
Verizon argues that its England reservation in the Commonwealth Court 
preserved its federal claims and avoids the preclusive effect of the state 
court decision. The sufficiency and effect of that reservation is in 
dispute 
and should be addressed by the District Court in the first instance. 
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Federal Practice and Procedure S 3914.6 at 529-30; and its 
denial should be subject to immediate review. See, e.g., 
Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 144 (state sovereign 
immunity immediately appealable); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 
526 (qualified executive immunity immediately appealable); 
Larsen v. Senate of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 152 
F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) (legislative immunity 
immediately appealable). Defenses to ultimate liability 
should not be subject to immediate review. See We, Inc. v. 
City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that Noerr-Pennington immunity was defense to 
liability and not immediately appealable); Transtech, 5 F.3d 
at 58 (holding that defense that suit barred by prior 
settlement or release is not immediately appealable). 
 
The fact, however, that a defense may warrant pre-trial 
dismissal is not dispositive of whether it is immediately 
appealable. See Digital, 511 U.S. at 873 (rejecting notion 
that every right that could be enforced by pretrial dismissal 
can be understood as conferring a right not to stand trial); 
We, Inc., 174 F.3d at 325 ("Not all defenses that warrant a 
pretrial dismissal entail a right not to stand trial."). We 
must determine the essential nature of the right to be 
protected to decide whether it is an immunity from trial or 
merely a defense to liability. 
 
An examination of the doctrine res judicata or claim 
preclusion reveals that it is better understood as a defense 
against liability, not an absolute guarantee against having 
to face a suit. Claim preclusion entitles a party to rely on 
prior judicial decisions and not to be held liable on claims 
on which that party previously has prevailed. Claim 
preclusion is based on concerns of fairness, on reliance on 
the finality of prior judicial determinations, and on the 
expectation of not having to conform primary conduct to 
inconsistent decisions and inconsistent legal obligations. 
See E.E.O.C. v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 492 
(3d Cir. 1990) (stating that claim preclusion fosters reliance 
on prior judicial decisions by minimizing the possibility of 
inconsistent judgments). It is not, however, an explicit 
guarantee that trial will not occur. Unlike qualified 
immunity or Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, 
claim preclusion is not based on a right to be free from all 
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the costs and burdens of having to be a party to a case in 
the first instance or from having to defend oneself. 
 
The interests protected by claim preclusion will not be 
irretrievably forfeited if the PUC must wait until after trial 
to appeal an erroneous res judicata determination. Perhaps 
that vindication will come after a delay and at a higher 
cost, but such cost is insufficient to establish collateral 
order doctrine jurisdiction. 
 
We turn now to the denial of the statute of limitations 
defense. A statute of limitations defense is considered to be 
of the same mold as claim preclusion. A denial of both is 
similarly unsuitable for immediate review. See , e.g., Digital, 
511 U.S. at 873 (discussing statute of limitations as same 
type of defense as claim preclusion, both presumptively not 
immediately appealable as part of a right not to stand trial); 
Transtech, 5 F.3d at 58 (rejecting immediate appealability of 
denial of defense that suit barred by settlement because 
recognizing immediate appeal in that circumstance would 
require recognizing immediate appeal for litigants asserting 
affirmative and dispositive defense of statute of limitations). 
 
The statute of limitations defense fails the third prong of 
the Cohen standard because it is not effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. See Brown v. 
United States, 881 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 1988); see also 
Parmar v. Jeetish Imp., Inc., 180 F.3d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 
1999) ("[T]he denial of a statute-of-limitations defense may 
effectively be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment."); 
Triad, 10 F.3d at 496 n.2 ("Limitations issues fail the last 
prong of this test."). In Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 
223, 237 (3d Cir. 1993), we held that an order joining a 
party to a lawsuit despite the lapse of the limitations period 
was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. We 
based that decision on our view that the statute of 
limitations provided only a right to repose that would not 
be irreparably lost if appeal must await final judgment. See 
id. at 232-33 (citing United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113 
(3d Cir. 1981)). 
 
Statutes of limitations are not guarantees that suit and 
trial will not occur on untimely claims. Limitations periods 
are designed to foreclose the potential for inaccuracies and 
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unfairness brought about by a finding of liability based on 
stale evidence. See Powers, 4 F.3d at 233 (quoting Levine, 
658 F.2d at 127). This interest is not in defending against 
an old claim, but an interest in not being held ultimately 
liable on that old claim based on old, less reliable evidence. 
Such an interest is not irretrievably lost if a party must 
wait until after final judgment to appeal the adverse ruling 
and to vindicate the right to be free from liability. Again, the 
litigation costs may be increased by the delay, but that 
alone is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
We will affirm the District Court's denial of the claims of 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. We lack 
appellate jurisdiction of the remainder of the issues on 
appeal; we will dismiss that portion of the appeal and 
remand this case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part: 
 
I concur in Judge Roth's excellent opinion for the same 
reasons set out in my concurrence in the companion 
opinion issued today in MCI Telecommunications Corp., et 
al. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., et al., Nos. 00- 
2257/58. 
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